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in computational economics have delivered algo-
rithms that make it feasible and simple to compute
higher-order approximations to the equilibrium
conditions of a general class of large stochastic
dynamic general equilibrium models (see, for
instance, Sims, 2000, and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe,
2004a). Several authors have applied this toolkit to
studying the welfare consequences of monetary
policy in environments without the special assump-
tion needed to make the linear approach work. And
I will report findings on the desirability of price
stability from this more numerically oriented branch
of the literature. 
Academic economists in the past have not
always arrived at the conclusion that price stability
should be a central objective of monetary policy. In
particular, many of the theoretical environments
that were used to study optimal policy in the 1980s
assumed that there are no impediments to instan-
taneous adjustment of factor and product prices. In
such environments, price stability in the sense of a
constant price level over time does not in general
represent the optimal monetary policy prescription.
Rather, under optimal monetary policy, prices move
over time in such a way as to eliminate the oppor-
tunity cost of holding money, that is, optimal policy
follows the Friedman rule. The opportunity cost of
holding money is the nominal interest rate, and, thus,
optimal monetary policy calls for a constant and
zero nominal interest rate. With nominal interest
rates constant, prices move in response to changes
in real interest rates, and fall on average at the real
rate of interest. 
In addition, Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991)
show that in a world in which the Friedman rule is
optimal, optimal monetary policy is associated with
high inflation volatility. In Chari, Christiano, and
Kehoe, the reason why inflation is highly volatile
under the optimal policy is that the government is




oodford concludes his review of what the
theoretical literature on optimal mone-
tary policy has to say about the desirabil-
ity of price stability with the following statement:
“It is not a bad first approximation to say that the
goal of monetary policy should be price stability.”
It follows from this conclusion that the findings of
the theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy
can be interpreted as supportive of inflation target-
ing. However, it does not imply that there should
be a single target variable—namely, inflation.
Optimal policy, as Woodford explains, can only
under quite special circumstances be described
solely in terms of the behavior of inflation. 
Woodford argues that even when full price sta-
bility fails to be optimal, near price stabilization is
optimal in many cases. In particular, Woodford
discusses that near stabilization of an appropriately
defined price index continues to be optimal (i) in
environments where negative real rates in combina-
tion with the zero bound on the nominal interest
rate make a path of zero inflation impossible, (ii) in
environments where asymmetric shocks require
relative price changes, (iii) in sticky-wage models, and
(iv) even in cases where the flexible-price equilibrium
is not efficient, due to the presence of (possibly time-
varying) market power or distorting taxes.
I would like to expand on this discussion and
add to the list of environments in which near price
stability is optimal. Also, I would like to give some
more specific examples. Most of the theoretical work
Woodford surveys uses dynamic, stochastic general
equilibrium models that contain some specific sim-
plifying assumption that make it possible to accu-
rately characterize optimal policy using only linear
approximations to the model and that allow for an
analytical characterization of optimal policy. Absent
those simplifying assumptions, one would have to
use higher-order approximations to the equilibrium
conditions for welfare calculations. Recent advances
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instrument. Specifically, it is assumed that the
government can levy distortionary income taxes
and can issue nominal non-state-contingent debt.
In financing innovations to its budget, the govern-
ment can therefore either adjust distortionary income
taxes or adjust real public liabilities through an
appropriate price level change. In the theoretical
environment of Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe sur-
prise changes in the price level are non-distorting,
whereas changes in the tax rates are distorting. As
a consequence, the optimal fiscal and monetary
policy mix calls for stable tax rates and highly volatile
inflation rates. 
Clearly, this branch of the theoretical literature
is at odds with the goal of price stability. In the
mid-1990s, rigidities in product and factor price
adjustment found renewed attention in monetary
economics. Under sticky prices, both the predictions
about the optimal level and the volatility of inflation
may change. First, authors such as Goodfriend and
King (1997) showed that in simple models with price
stickiness but no money, the optimal inflation rate
is zero at all times and under all circumstances.
Khan, King, and Wolman (2003) show that if one is
to introduce money into the sticky-price model, a
tension arises between nominal interest rate stabi-
lization at zero—to minimize the distortions associ-
ated with money—and the sticky-price friction,
which calls for constant prices at all times and under
all circumstances. Khan, King, and Wolman show
that for realistic calibrations of their model, the
optimal level of inflation is just –76 basis points.
(In their calibration, the Friedman rule would call
for inflation of –293 basis points and, absent the
monetary distortion, optimal policy is associated
with zero inflation.) That is, the optimal long-run
inflation rate is not that different from the one that
is optimal in a sticky-price model without money. 
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b) study optimal
monetary and fiscal policy in a model with (i) sticky
prices, (ii) money demand, (iii) distortionary taxation,
and (iv) a fiscal role for price level variations. In that
economy, as in the work of Chari, Christiano, and
Kehoe (1991), price level variations are desirable
because they allow the fiscal authority to finance
surprises in its budget by inflating or deflating the real
value of government debt rather than via changes in
distortionary income tax rates. Therefore, there exist
additional reasons to deviate from price stability
beyond those present in Khan, King, and Wolman.
Yet, for a model calibrated to the U.S. economy,
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b) find that under the
Ramsey policy, the mean of inflation and its standard
deviation is close to zero. As shown in Table 1, in
the sticky-price economy, the Ramsey optimal mean
rate of inflation is only –0.16 percent and the opti-
mal inflation volatility 0.17 percent. By contrast,
under fully flexible prices, the mean inflation rate is
–3.66 percent and the standard deviation of inflation
is 6.04 percentage points.
Furthermore, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b)
show that the inflation-volatility tax-rate-volatility
trade-off is resolved in favor of inflation stability not
only for degrees of price stickiness observed in the
U.S. economy, but also for much lesser degrees of
price stickiness. This point is illustrated in Figure 1,
which shows on the horizontal axis the degree of
price stickiness as measured by a parameter θ. When
prices are perfectly flexible, then the parameter θ
is equal to zero. As the parameter θ increases, prices
become more sticky. The value of price stickiness
estimated for the U.S. economy is 4.4. The graph
shows that even for a degree of price stickiness ten
times smaller than the value estimated for the post-
war U.S. economy, the optimal inflation volatility is
below 1 percent per year. These findings are further
support for Woodford’s conclusion that, in most
existing work, price stability should be the central
goal of optimal monetary policy. 
This conclusion is based on evidence that relies
exclusively on models without an accumulable factor
of production. Next, I discuss some evidence on
the desirability of price stability in models where
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Desirability of Price Stability in an Optimal
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Problem
Standard 
Variable Mean deviation Autocorrelation
Flexible-price economy
π –3.66 6.04 –0.04
R 00—
Sticky-price economy
π –0.16 0.17 0.04
R 3.85 0.56 0.87
NOTE: Inflation, π, and the nominal interest rate, R,a r e
expressed in percentage points.
SOURCE: Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b).
Table 1
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physical capital is a factor of production and can be
accumulated. The basic elements of the model with
capital accumulation are, as in the one discussed
above, that money facilitates purchases of goods,
product markets are monopolistically competitive,
the government must finance a stochastic stream
of public consumption either with lump-sum or
income taxes, and prices are sticky à la Calvo (1983).
The production technology is described by some
homogenous-of-degree-one function and is subject
to shocks to total factor productivity (ztF(Kt, Ht)). The
evolution of capital is given by Kt+1=(1–δ) Kt–1+It.
In Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), we compute
welfare in that economy under a number of alter-
native monetary and fiscal policy arrangements.
One of the policies considered is one in which the
inflation rate is held forever constant. We refer to
that policy as inflation targeting. We compute the
welfare consequences for the various rules under
the assumption that business cycles are driven by
government purchases and total factor productivity
shocks. We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy.
We consider monetary policy rules of the type 
(1) ,
where a hat over a variable indicates log-deviations
from its non-stochastic steady-state value and 
(2) .
The variable measuring the output gap here is y ˆt,
which denotes the deviations of output from the
non-stochastic steady state. Related studies typically
use a different measure of the output gap—namely,
one that measures the log-difference between the
actual level of output and the one that would obtain
in a model without price-adjustment frictions. (This
is what Woodford refers to as the properly defined
real stabilization objective.) Note that this is not
simply the difference of output from a linear time
trend, rather this is a highly sophisticated concept.
To be able to estimate that output gap, one needs
to know what the current realizations of the shocks
are and one has to know exactly where the nominal
frictions lie and how to compute the flexible-price
equilibrium.
The advantage of the interest rate feedback rule
given in equation (2) is that it puts even fewer infor-
mational requirements on the monetary authority.
To implement this rule, all the central bank needs to
know are the current values of output and inflation,
the past value of the nominal interest rate and output,
ˆˆ ˆ / R Ry y tt ty t t =+ + −− 11 απ α π ln
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ RR y j t Rt tj ytj =++ = − + −− − αα π α π 1 10 1 ,      for  , ,
and the central bank’s inflation target, π*. The infla-
tion target is needed to compute π ˆt. Note that this rule
does not require knowledge of the non-stochastic
steady state; in particular, it is not necessary to know
the non-stochastic steady-state value of output or
the nominal interest rate. 
For each case that we consider, we find that the
highest level of welfare is attained under a policy
of inflation targeting—that is, when the central bank
conducts policy in such a way that in equilibrium
the inflation rate is equal to its non-stochastic steady-
state value at all times. This finding suggests that
even in models with capital, money, and distorting
taxes (but flexible wages), price stabilization should
be the overriding goal of policy. Table 2 illustrates
this point for the case that all taxes are lump-sum
and the economy is cashless. Similar results hold
for the monetary economy and in the presence of
distorting taxes. Inflation targeting yields at least as
much welfare as any of the optimized rules consid-
ered. Thus it provides further evidence that inflation
stability is desirable.
The table suggests two other interesting
results. One is that it is optimal not to respond to
output. This is reflected in the fact that the optimal
response coefficient on output is zero in almost all
cases. The second is that the welfare differences











Degree of Price Stickiness and Optimal 
Inflation Volatility
Standard Deviation of π
Degree of Price Stickiness, θ
NOTE: The baseline value of     is 4.4. The standard deviation 
is measured in percent per year.
SOURCE: Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b).
θ
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between the various optimized rules and inflation
targeting are negligible from a welfare point of view
as long as the central bank has the option to smooth
interest rates over time. 
The second point raises an interesting issue.
Clearly, one would like to know what the optimal
monetary policy is. But, at the same time, it is also
important to gauge how costly it would be to pursue
a policy that is not the optimal one but something
that one could realistically implement in practice. For
example, the optimal policy prescription presented
by Woodford in the appendix (drawing on Giannoni
and Woodford, forthcoming) is based on an esti-
mated model with wage and price stickiness. Conse-
quently, one would expect the optimal policy to be
quite complex, and indeed so it is. Its characterization
involves not only current values but also infinite-lead
polynomials of wages, prices, and a sophisticated
output gap measure. So it is natural to ask how much
of a quantitative difference it would make in terms
of welfare to follow this optimal policy prescription
as opposed to a much simpler one. In addition, it
would be useful to know whether it is important to
get the response coefficients exactly right or whether
there exists a large family of rules that are associated
with welfare levels that are very close to the level
of welfare associated with the optimum. These are
quantitative questions that are necessarily model
specific.
As a first pass on this question, I will present
some numerical results from the economy studied
in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) described above.
In that particular framework there may be very little
difference between a large number of monetary
policies that the central bank can follow. The econ-
omy of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) differs from
the Giannoni and Woodford economy in several
dimensions. Our model features capital accumula-
tion, whereas the Giannoni and Woodford economy
does not. On the other hand, the Giannoni and
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Desirability of Price Stability in a Model with Capital Accumulation
απ αy αR Welfare Welfare cost
I. Monetary policy: R ˆ
t = αππ ˆt–i + αyy ˆt–i + αRR ˆ
t–1
Smoothing
Current-looking (i = 0) 3 0 0.9 –628.2180 0
Backward-looking (i = 1) 3 0 2.8 –628.2207 0.0004
Forward-looking (i = –1) 3 0 –2.3 –628.8657 0.0886
No smoothing
Current-looking (i = 0) 3 0 — –628.2193 0.0002
Backward-looking (i = 1) 3 –1.2 — –629.2988 0.1477
Forward-looking (i = –1) The equilibrium is indeterminate
II. Monetary policy: R ˆ
t – R ˆ
t–1 = αππ ˆt + αy[y ˆt – y ˆt–1]
3 0 — –628.2180 <0
III. Monetary policy: inflation targeting π ˆt = 0
–628.2175 –0.00007
NOTE: (i) Rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate, πt denotes the gross inflation rate, and yt denotes output. (ii) For any variable xt,
its non-stochastic steady-state value is denoted by x, and its log-deviation from steady state by x ˆt ; ln(xt/x). (iii) In all cases, the parameters
απ, αy, and αR are restricted to lie in the interval [–3,3]. (iv) Welfare is defined as follows: Let V(st) denote the equilibrium level of lifetime
utility of the representative household in period t given that period’s state st. Then welfare is defined as V(s). (v) The welfare cost is
relative to the optimal current-looking rule with smoothing and is defined as the percentage decrease in the consumption process
associated with the optimal rule necessary to make the level of welfare under the optimized rule identical to that under the alternative
policy considered. Thus, a positive figure indicates that welfare is higher under the optimized rule than under the alternative policy
considered. (vi) Computations are based on a second-order approximation.
SOURCE: Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003).
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Woodford framework features habit formation, sticky
wages (which is an important difference, as it makes
price stabilization less desirable), and some decision
lags that make that framework match estimated
empirical impulse responses. Ours is not an esti-
mated model. 
Figure 2 shows regions of the interest rate feed-
back rule coefficients αR and απ introduced in equa-
tion (1) for which the welfare cost of following that
policy (as opposed to the optimized rule) is at most
5 one-hundredths of 1 percent of the consumption
stream associated with the optimized rule. In these
computations the output response coefficient is held
constant at zero (αy=0). The graph shows that the
region of parameters for which the equilibrium is
unique is virtually the same as the region for which
the welfare costs are below 5 basis points. This sug-
gests that from a welfare point of view, it does not
really matter to which values the central banks sets
the response coefficients in the interest rate feedback
rule as long as they render the equilibrium deter-
minate. Similar results hold for the feedback rule
given in equation (2), with αy equal to its optimized
value of zero (see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2003). 
My last comment concerns the implementation
of inflation targeting. In particular, one interesting
issue is whether the emphasis on price stability that
comes out of the theoretical literature on optimal
monetary policy implies that interest rates should
respond little to output measures. Suppose the cen-
tral bank chooses to implement its policy objectives
by following a feedback rule for the short-term
nominal interest rate that it controls. The results
presented in Table 2 indicate that the optimal
response coefficient on the output gap should be
zero, where the output gap is defined as the log-
deviation of output from steady state. As we show
in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), the welfare losses














t =   RR ˆ
t–1 +         α αππ ˆ t
NOTE: A dot represents a parameter combination for which the equilibrium is
determinate. A circle de notes that the welfare co st of the policy relative to the
optimized rule (i.e.,      = 3,     = 0,  and      = 0.9) is less than 0.05 percent.
SOURCE: Schmitt-Groh !  and Uribe (2003).   
απ αy αR
Figure 2
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from choosing a non-zero coefficient on output can
be large. We find values in excess of one-tenth of 1
percent of the stream of consumption associated
with the optimized rule.1The argument that respond-
ing to output can lead to relatively sizeable welfare
losses has been criticized on the grounds that the
output measure used in the monetary policy rule is
“not the right one.” The argument goes that, were
one instead to use an output gap measure based on
the difference between actual output and the output
that would arise in a world without nominal frictions,
then the welfare losses from responding to output
in the feedback rule would be much smaller. 
In practice the central bank may not be able to
construct this sophisticated output gap measure
and will instead use a simple measure that is much
more akin to log deviations from a constant trend.
Furthermore, one can show that if the output gap is
interpreted as the difference of the quarterly output
growth rate from some constant, then welfare losses
associated with responding to that measure of out-
put are small as well. Under such a rule it is still
optimal not to respond to output (see the second
panel of Table 2). However, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2003) show that the welfare differences between a
zero output coefficient and an output coefficient
between –3 and 3 is at most 0.03 percentage points
of the consumption stream associated with the best
feedback rule. This welfare loss is relatively small.
These findings suggest that when implementing
inflation targeting through interest rate feedback
rules it may suffice to respond to variations in infla-
tion alone. Second, a reason for policymakers to
abstain from responding to output variations is that
such behavior may have significant welfare conse-
quences if the policymaker does not have the proper
output gap measure. It is important to keep in mind
that the optimal policy behavior advocated here does
not have stabilization of inflation as its ultimate
objective, but instead the maximization of welfare.
Thus, even though the implementation of the optimal
policy takes the form of a rule that responds little
to variations in the level of aggregate activity, this
does not imply that the reasons for adopting this
policy are that the policymaker does not fully inter-
nalize the welfare consequences of output fluctua-
tions. One caveat is that these recommendations
stem from an analysis in which factor prices are
assumed to be fully flexible. It remains to be shown
in future work how large the welfare costs or benefits
of responding to output are in a world with sluggish
factor price adjustments.
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